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Abstract
We examine behavior in Cournot and Stackelberg markets in a simple experiment where
participants experience both market forms. Moreover, Stackelberg followers have to submit
full response strategies. Our main finding is that Stackelberg followers employ rather flat,
reciprocal response function, i.e., they punish leaders in who try to exploit their strategic
adavantage and are willing to cooperate with cooperative leaders. Also, it turns out that prior
exposure to a symmetric market makes followers more aggressive which hints at the role of
aspiration levels in markets.
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In a recent paper Huck, Muller, and Normann (2001, henceforth HMN) report a ﬁrst experi-
mental comparison of Stackelberg and Cournot duopolies. They replicate previous results for
Cournot markets, ﬁnding stable equilibrium play for random matchings and some collusion for
ﬁxed matchings. For the Stackelberg case, their main ﬁnding is that behaviour did not settle
down to the theoretical prediction, with leaders producing less and followers producing more
than is predicted by theory. Both shifts imply signiﬁcantly lower market concentration than
theoretically predicted.
This result appeared mainly to be driven by followers playing according to reaction curves
that were much ﬂatter than predicted by theory. Flat reaction functions can be interpreted as
reciprocal as they are “nasty” to greedy leaders and “nice” to cooperative leaders. Given such
reaction curves, a leader’s best response is to produce less than in the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium. However, HMN did not observe full response strategies as their subjects played
sequentially. Hence, their estimates of response functions are potentially biased by the uneven
distribution of leaders’ quantities.
In this paper we test the robustness of HMN’s results by employing a diﬀerent method of
eliciting choices. While HMN studied sequentially taken decisions (repeated over ten rounds in
either random or ﬁxed-pairs matching)1 we employ the so-called strategy method (Selten 1967).
Each subject plays both games, but only once each. The obvious advantage of the strategy
method is that we can gather much more data in otherwise seldomly reached information sets.
This allows us to present estimates of followers’ response functions that are less biased than
HMN’s.
Our main ﬁnding is that Stackelberg followers indeed employ rather ﬂat, reciprocal response
function, ie, they quite calmly plan to punish leaders in case they try to exploit their strategic
adavantage and, at the same time, they are willing to not to exploit cooperative moves by the
leader. Moreover, it turns out that prior exposure to a symmetric market makes followers more
aggressive which hints at the role of aspiration levels in markets. Both results might be of
relevance to explaining (endogenous) market structures in the ﬁeld.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we brieﬂy present the theory
and then the experimental design. Section 3 presents the data and their analysis. Section 4
concludes.
2 Theory and experimental design
As with HMN, we study two duopoly markets, Cournot and Stackelberg, using quantity com-
petition, with both ﬁrms facing linear inverse demand
p(Q) = max{30 − Q,0},Q = q1 + q2
1As with the Cournot case, behaviour became less competitive when pairs were ﬁxed.
1Cournot ﬁrst Stackelberg ﬁrst
Stackelberg leader LeCo 11 LeSt 10
Stackelberg follower FoCo 12 FoSt 11
Table 1: Design of the experiment and number of subjects.
and where linear costs are given by
Ci(qi) = 6qi,i = 1,2.
In the experiment only quantities from the ﬁnite grid {3,4,...,15} were feasible.2
Stackelberg and Cournot markets diﬀer in the timing of the decision. In the Cournot
market, both ﬁrms decide on quantities simultaneously, but in the Stackelberg market one ﬁrm,
the leader, decides on its quantity, qL, then the other ﬁrm, the follower, knowing the leader’s
quantity decides on its quantity, qF. Theory predicts q1 = q2 = 8 in the Cournot case and
qL = 12, qF = 1
2(24 − qL) = 6 in the Stackelberg market.
HMN studied both of these two markets with repeated experiments, using two treatments,
ﬁxed matching and random matching, over ten periods. We take an alternative experiment,
where we get each subject to write down either their Stackelberg follower response function or
their Stackelberg leader quantity. We also get each subject to decide on their Cournot quantity.
The order in which a subject decides (either Stackelberg ﬁrst or Cournot ﬁrst) aﬀords four
diﬀerent positions in the experiment and enables us to gain further information on attitudes
to competitiveness. See table 1 for experimental design and numbers participating in each
experiment.
The experiment was conducted in one large session, and run with pen and paper. Subjects
were randomly split into the four groups as described, and given written instructions and a sheet
where they marked their Cournot strategy, their Stackelberg leader quantity or wrote down their
whole response function (ie their response for each possible quantity from a Stackelberg leader)
if they were Stackelberg followers. Then we announced a second round of the experiment with
new instructions. Subjects who had been playing in the Cournot treatment were randomly
assigned the roles of Stackelberg leaders or followers, and subjects who had been playing in the
Stackelberg treatment were now assigned roles in the Cournot market. There was no feedback
information about what had happened in the ﬁrst round.
The subjects were informed that, at the end of the experiment, for each round and treatment
two pairs would be randomly matched and would receive payoﬀs given their performance.
Payoﬀs were according to the above functions multiplied by £0.10. Average payoﬀs were around
£6. The experiment lasted roughly 30 minutes.
2Moreover, payoﬀs were slightly manipulated to ensure unique best responses and a unique Nash equilibrium.
See also HMN who used the same payoﬀ matrix.
2qL 1 2 3 4 5 6
FoCo 10.17 10.17 9.83 9.17 8.33 8.25
(2.08) (1.59) (1.27) (1.27) (1.61) (1.76)
FoSt 8.91 8.36 8.45 7.18 7.36 7.00
(3.75) (2.69) (2.38) (2.35) (2.87) (2.45)
7 8 9 10 11 12 13
8.00 7.42 7.00 6.83 6.92 6.58 6.42
(2.41) (1.93) (1.76) (1.99) (1.83) (2.50) (2.61)
7.36 6.82 6.36 5.91 5.73 5.73 5.91
(2.84) (1.99) (2.84) (2.34) (2.10) (2.10) (3.39)
Table 2: Average Stackelberg followers quantities and standard deviations.









Table 3: Average Stackelberg leader and Cournot quantities
3 Results
We investigate two main questions: How do the ﬁndings compare to the theory? And how
do they compare to HMN? In particular, we are interested in whether the use of the strategy
method provides more information about the reaction curves employed by followers.
We provide summary statistics about quantity choices in Tables 2 and 3. And there are a
few facts immediately emerging from the tables.
1. The Cournot equilibrium predicts behavior reasonably well for all subjects.3
2. Stackelberg leaders produce roughly 20% less than predicted.
3. Stackelberg followers’ reaction curves are less steep than predicted. This holds for those
who started with Stackelberg as well as for those who started with Cournot. The latter
subjects are, however, more aggressive and produce, on average, one unit more than the
former.
3Subjects who were Stackelberg followers in the ﬁrst round produced on average more than all other groups.
But these diﬀerences are not signiﬁcant.
3γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 R2
FoCo & FoSt 10.490∗ −0.344∗ −1.571∗ 0.065 0.815
(0.205) (0.026) (0.297) (0.037)
Table 4: Estimated response function.
Thus, at ﬁrst glance we ﬁnd behavior is very similar to what HMN observe. There are, how-
ever, additional eﬀects of the order in which subjects encountered the two market environments.
A possible explanation for this is discussed below.
In order to analyse follower behavior more closely we estimate reaction curves using a linear
regression. We include treatment dummies and subject dummies (both, for intercept and
slope).4 More speciﬁcally, we estimate the following equation:
qF = γ0 + γ1qL + γ2I + γ3qLI
where I is an indicator variable taking the value 1 when the subject has played Cournot ﬁrst
and 0 otherwise. Table 4 presents the regression results. Figure 1 illustrates the estimated
reaction functions for the two values of I (together with the theoretical reaction function).
The regression conﬁrms what we have seen above with the naked eye: For both groups of
subjects, the slope is less steep than theoretically predicted.5 And as with HMN the estimated
reaction curves cross the theoretically predicted one roughly at Cournot. That, of course,
means that followers are, at least partially, cooperative when leaders produce less than Cournot.
But, at the same time, they are more aggressive when leaders try to exploit their theoretical
advantage. This conﬁrms the results in HMN—but now on the basis of having observed full
strategies. The estimates also conﬁrm that followers who ﬁrst played in a Cournot market are
signiﬁcantly more aggressive than those who start out as a follower in round 1 of the experiment.
The best response of a leader against the estimated reaction curve of followers who started
as followers would have been 10.30, the best response against the curve of followers who started
with playing Cournot would have been 10.46. Thus, the leaders in our experiment did a
remarkably good job in predicting followers’ behavior even though they had zero experience
and no opportunities for learning.6
4 Discussion and conclusion
Before turning to a brief discussion of our main results we would like to make one observation
from a methodological point of view. There has recently been a discussion about whether the
4Subject dummies are coded such that coeﬃcients of treatment dummies present actual averages. See HMN
for the same procedure.
5In fact, looking at each persons’ response function individually we ﬁnd that not one of them is steeper than
the theoretical prediction.
























Figure 1: Illustration of Follower diﬀerences
strategy method can be seen as a reliable way of eliciting data or whether there are certain
biases one must accept when using it. For example, Brandts and Charness (2000) provide
evidence on a number of games where there are essentially no diﬀerences between sequential
play (“hot”) and the strategy method (“cold”). Guth, Huck, and Muller (2001), on the other
hand, report data from mini ultimatum games where there is a huge diﬀerence between the
two methods. This note adds to the evidence provided by Brandts and Charness (2000). In
Stackelberg games it seems rather safe to use the strategy method. Potentially, this can make
further experiments much cheaper.
Concerning the main questions raised in this note, we ﬁrst of all conclude that reaction
curves of Stackelberg followers are indeed much ﬂatter than predicted and that this is, almost
perfectly, anticipated by leaders. Subjects are able to put themselves into others’ shoes which,
in this case, avoids massive conﬂict and, moreover, renders markets much less concentrated than
theoretically predicted. We think it would not be surprising to ﬁnd similar patterns in actual
industries. If strategically weaker ﬁrms act spitefully, ﬁrms that are strategically stronger, for
example because of successful innovation, may not be able to exploit their advantage as one
would expect from a naive game-theoretic analysis.7
Moreover, we ﬁnd that subjects who start in a symmetric environment act more aggressively
as Stackelberg followers than others who ﬁnd themselves in a weak strategic position right at
7Rather, models that incorporate inequality aversion (as, for example, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000 or Fehr
and Schmidt 1999) might also be tested for their usefulness for explaining industrial behavior.
5the start. We conjecture that this is driven by aspiration levels.8 Once subjects experience
symmetric payoﬀs they are not easily forced into an unfavorable position. In other words, they
are willing to bite back.9 This fact, too, might have signiﬁcant consequences for the evolution
of actual market structures.
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